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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
This study explores the relationships between information asymmetry, firm 
performance, capital market attributes/consequences, disclosure in general and voluntary 
disclosure of financial targets in particular.  
A financial target is a commitment to achieving a specific financial goal within a 
certain time frame. Financial target-disclosing firms issue one or more specific goals or 
targets, such as (growth in) earnings, sales, ebitda, costs, or a measure of profitability. There 
exists extensive research on management expectations, but not on management targets. The 
primary difference between a target and an expectation is goal commitment: the 
unwillingness to abandon or lower a target.1 This means that once a target is issued, it will 
not be revised downward. 
The main theoretical basis for this thesis is the principal-agent model, where 
information asymmetry exists between the principal (shareholders) and the agent 
(management) as a result of the separation of firm ownership and control. The agency 
problem was suggested by Berle and Means (1932) and formalized by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Grossman and Hart (1983).  
Mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure are mechanisms to reduce information 
asymmetry. Mandatory disclosures and voluntary disclosures serve two roles: to aid decision 
making, and to account for stewardship (Chen, 1975; Gjesdal, 1981). Since firms are not 
obliged to report forward looking information such as forecasts and targets, target disclosure 
is part of voluntary disclosed information. Target disclosure is therefore related to the fields 
of disclosure quality as well as the management forecast literature.  
In this chapter, I briefly present the relation of voluntary target disclosure with 
existing literature. I conclude this chapter with my research questions. 
1.1 Mandatory disclosure  
 
Management has more information about the firm than its shareholders and can 
benefit from their information advantage in two ways. First, management can use its 
information advantage to increase the benefits of insider trading.2 This element of the agency 
                                               
1
 For a further discussion between targets and forecasts, see section 1.3. 
2
 Or time the release of news in order to optimize the payoff from option grants (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). 
Also, when shares are issued, an adverse selection problem arises. Furthermore, an adverse selection problem 
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problem is known as adverse selection or hidden information. The moral hazard - hidden 
action - problem relates to the difficulty that shareholders have in assessing management 
effort, which they cannot observe directly. Akerlof (1970) has shown that in addition to costs 
to individuals3, costs to society exist because in the presence of information asymmetry either 
markets perform in a sub-optimal way or they cease to exist completely.4  
In order to reduce information asymmetry between management and shareholders, 
and thus to improve the functioning of the stock market, statutory disclosure is required by 
GAAP. In order for statutory disclosure to be useful, the disclosed information needs to be 
credible. Credibility is attained to some extent by external auditor certification and SEC 
enforcement.5 Examples of research on statutory disclosures include Clarke and Murray 
(2000), Collins et al. (1981) and Lev and Thiagarajan (1993). Kothari (2001) reviews 
research on the relation between stock prices and accounting information that suggests 
regulated accounting information provides valuable information to investors.  
In creating accounting principles, standard setters make a trade-off between the costs 
and benefits of proposed standards. The benefits of disclosed information consist of reduced 
information asymmetry, which enables investors to better value the firm and/or assess 
management effort. The costs consist of direct costs of preparing and releasing the 
information as well as indirect costs such as the change in future cash flows resulting from 
the actions of others who also act on the information released. For example, information that 
is useful for investors to value the firm may also be useful for competing firms to update their 
strategy. Dye (1985) defines these costs as proprietary costs.6   
 Hence, GAAP requires limited disclosure and the historical cost principle is an 
important basis for valuation since financial reporting relates to a period in the past.7 
                                                                                                                                                  
exists when management withholds bad news hoping it will be compensated by possible future good news 
(Scott, 2006). 
3
 In the case of adverse selection, costs arise as investors buy shares at inflated prices. In the case of moral 
hazard, the costs consist of a reduced stock price as a result of management’s shirking.  
4
 Stock prices are bid down by investors unable to distinguish between cherries and lemons. Furthermore, 
allocation of capital is suboptimal, as too little (much) capital is flowing into cherries (lemons).  
5
 Not all information is audited. Interim results, and the management discussion and analysis are examples of 
unaudited information. Stock exchanges also have listing requirements. Furthermore, legal action against 
management can be taken by shareholders and by the firm. 
6
 Dye separates proprietary from nonproprietary information. Dye argues that the release of proprietary 
information affects the behavior of others, affecting future cash flows of the firm, whereas the release of 
nonproprietary information only affects investors’ believes about future cash flows. It can be argued, however, 
that all information is proprietary. For example, competitors may also enter (leave) the industry, when a 
company issues good news (bad news) regarding the earnings forecast, thus affecting cash flows. When stock 
price is used as a source of information on which market participants base their decisions, all information that 
could affect stock price is proprietary. 
7
 Even though IFRS is moving towards fair value accounting. 
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However, investors on the other hand are primarily interested in future profitability rather 
than past performance: 
 
“(M)anagement should explicitly describe its strategies, plans, and expectations.” 
Knutson, 1992.8  
 
   In addition to statutory disclosure required by GAAP, management may voluntarily 
disclose additional information. In general, management is expected to do so whenever the 
benefits of voluntary disclosure – including a reduction of information asymmetry – exceed 
the costs of disclosure.   
1.2 Voluntary disclosure 
 
Microeconomic theory assumes that an individual makes a decision by choosing an 
alternative that maximizes his utility function. When this assumption is applied to the 
decision of whether to disclosure or not9, management is expected (not) to disclose if 
(non)disclosure yields the highest utility outcome. This does not necessarily imply that 
management only voluntarily discloses additional information that qualifies as good news. It 
may very well be optimal to disclose bad news timely, for example by issuing an earnings 
warning in order to prevent a class action lawsuit and/or to mitigate a future stock price 
decline. Empirical evidence indicates that management manages earnings and lowers 
expectations in order to avoid negative earnings surprises (Matsumoto, 2002).  
Management faces uncertainty when dealing with disclosure decisions. Uncertainty 
exists as to how the stakeholders will react to the information released. More importantly, 
when issuing forward looking information such as earnings guidance, uncertainty exists as to 
whether or not the forecasts will be met. Survey results from Graham et al. (2005) indicate 
that managers feel that missing their own earnings forecast is worse than missing the analyst 
earnings forecast, because missing their own forecast signals that management has little 
control over their firm. This is also supported by the findings of Skinner (1995), who reports 
that when management revises an outstanding forecast, the revision is most likely to be a 
downward revision rather than an upward revision. Jog and McConomy (2003) report that 
firms missing a forecast are penalized far beyond than that which would have been predicted 
                                               
8
 The recommendations in a position paper on the future of financial reporting by the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR). 
9
 Disclosure decision: whether or not to disclose, and if so, which information, the level of detail, the medium, 
and the point in time. 
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had they not issued a forecast. However, it is important to note that the disclosure decision is 
not a stand-alone decision. Firms determine their disclosure policy together with their 
operational and strategic issues, accounting policy choices, etc. (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In practice, various disclosure decisions are related. Papers that use disclosure quality 
rankings report that different elements of disclosure quality are positively correlated (see for 
example Lang and Lundholm (1993), Botosan (1997) and Miller (2002)). In the following 
discussion I focus on disclosing a single item for simplicity. The disclosure decision for a 
specific item involves several parameters. 
First, management needs to decide on the level of detail, or specificity. For example, 
when management issues a press release in which it publicly announces an important 
agreement with another party, management decides whether or not to disclose the financial 
details of the agreement. In the case of earnings guidance, management can indicate the sign 
of the expected earnings change, a lower/upper bound, a range, a point estimate or a 
qualitative statement. 
Second, the degree to which the disclosure binds future disclosure decisions may 
differ. Prior to the release of any information, investors have initial beliefs about 
management’s disclosure policy. Investors will update these beliefs when management 
discloses additional information, regardless of the contents of the disclosure. For example, 
when management schedules a conference call for the first time, investors will expect 
conference calls to be scheduled for future periods as well. Indeed survey results of Graham 
et al. (2005) indicate that managers try to avoid setting disclosure precedents that will be 
difficult to maintain. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) investigate German firms that voluntarily 
adopted International Accounting Standards (IAS), which require more disclosure than 
German GAAP. Investors expect management to continue to report under IAS and will 
perceive abandoning IAS as a negative signal.10  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that abolishing a policy of issuing short term earnings 
guidance also has adverse consequences. In a press release by Coca-Cola on December 12, 
2002, Coca-Cola pointed out that their commitment to long term growth in earnings of 12% 
would continue, while at the same time they announced that they would stop to issue 
guidance for the short term: 
 
"Establishing short-term guidance prevents a more meaningful focus on the strategic 
initiatives that a company is taking to build its business and succeed over the long 
                                               
10
 In 2005 IFRS has become mandatory for listed firms in the European Union. 
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run," Coke's chairman and chief executive, Douglas Daft, said in a prepared 
statement. "We are managing this business for the long term." 
WSJ.COM WRAP: Coca-Cola Stops Issuing Earnings Estimates. 
 
 However, skeptics interpreted the decision to abolish short term guidance as Coca-
Cola withholding bad news since Coca-Cola repeatedly missed analysts’ forecasts in the prior 
year.11  
Third, management needs to decide on the means with which to communicate the 
information to investors. In the United States, after Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation 
FD), all information that is price-sensitive needs to be disclosed through channels that are 
publicly accessible. Thus, price-sensitive information can be included in the annual report, 
press release or in a conference call. Management can still organize private meetings with 
institutional investors under the restriction that no price sensitive information is shared.12 
Fourth, management needs to decide on timing of the disclosure. They can do so in a 
way that maximizes firm value or in a way that opportunistically transfers wealth from 
shareholders to themselves. An example of the former is the disclosure of good news prior to 
issuance of shares in order to limit dilution. Regarding the latter issue, results of Aboody and 
Kasznik (2000) show that managers delay disclosures of good news and accelerate disclosure 
of bad news prior to fixed stock option awards. 
1.3 Analytical disclosure literature 
1.3.1 The Disclosure Principle and the Revelation Principle 
 
The two important principles that underlie the mechanics of voluntary disclosure are 
the Disclosure Principle and the Revelation Principle. The former predicts that management 
will fully disclose all information voluntarily whereas the latter suggests that every contract 
entered into with management can be (re)written in such a way that management truthfully 
reveals all information.  
 
The Disclosure Principle 
 
                                               
11
 Financial Times (London, England), December 14, 2002: Coca-Cola snubs myopia of Wall St beverages. 
12
 Even though no price sensitive information is shared, institutional fund managers highly value these meetings 
as they have the opportunity to meet management face to face and “seeing the white’s of their eyes” (Roberts et 
al., 2006, p. 281). 
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Milgrom (1981) models a ‘persuasion game’, where a seller – the salesman – provides 
information to a decision maker – the buyer – in order to influence his decision. The 
salesman may report or conceal information about his product, but he cannot misreport it. 
Milgrom shows that the equilibrium consists of a situation where the salesman always fully 
discloses his information. The mechanism that provides this full disclosure is that the buyer 
will be suspicious to the withholding of any information and will interpret this as unfavorable 
to the product. At a sequential equilibrium, the price that the buyer is willing to pay becomes 
so low, that the initial unfavorable information becomes favorable at some point. This 
mechanism that results in full voluntary disclosure has been named as the Disclosure 
Principle (Dye, 1985) in the literature. 
The setting of Milgrom’s persuasion game is an adverse selection problem which can 
be generalized to the agency problem between shareholders and management. Hence, one 
could jump to the conclusion that the Disclosure Principle predicts that management always 
fully discloses all information, which means that no regulation requiring mandatory 
disclosure is needed. However, the following four conditions need to be met in order for the 
Disclosure Principle to hold: (1) there is no cost of disclosure, (2) the buyer/shareholder 
knows that the seller/management has information, (3) the seller/management cannot lie, and 
(4) information is interpreted homogeneously (Grossman, 1981; Grossman and Hart, 1980; 
Milgrom, 1981). Since these four conditions are hardly ever met, full voluntary disclosure is 
seldom observed in practice.  
Vast literature exists that relax the various assumptions of the Disclosure Principle. 
Examples of this research include Verrecchia (1983) and Wagenhofer (1990), who introduce 
the notion of the cost of disclosure. Dye (1985) models a situation where investors are not 
sure about the existence and/or the quality of information held by management. Korn and 
Schiller (2003) examine management’s behavior when strategic misreporting is part of 
management’s action set, and Dutta and Trueman (2002) analyze the setting where there is 
uncertainty about the interpretation of the disclosed information by investors. These 
analytical papers result in partial disclosure equilibria, which is consistent with observed non-
disclosure in practice. 
 
The Revelation Principle 
 
 According to the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979), any contract can be rewritten 
in such a way that it induces management to full disclosure, without having an effect on 
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management’s compensation. The following assumptions underlie the Revelation Principle: 
(1) communication is costless, there are no information processing costs for the principal and 
no contract complexity costs exist; (2) agents cannot collude13; and most importantly (3) the 
principal commits upfront to a mechanism that implies that he cannot renegotiate it later 
(Mookherjee, 2006). 
 Dye (1985) points out three reasons as to why the revelation principle does not hold in 
the voluntary disclosure context: 
 
“First, suppose that, subsequent to one agent’s announcement of the true value of his 
private information, the other agents could recontract so as to take advantage of this 
newly revealed information. Recognizing this possibility, each agent may fail to 
disclose his private information completely.” (Dye, 1985, p. 139) 
 
 The other two reasons are that in practice agents are incapable of communicating all 
dimensions of their private information and that it is costly to rewrite contracts or to send 
messages. 
1.3.2 The cost of equity capital  
 
Does a theoretical basis for a relation between voluntary disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital exist?14 Only recently has there been research that links the two concepts 
together. The most widely used model to estimate the cost of equity capital is the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). About 75% of CFOs use the CAPM as their primary method 
to estimate their cost of capital (Graham and Harvey, 2001). However, the drawback of the 
CAPM is that it involves only a single risk driver, which is known as beta.15 Informational 
assumptions underlie the CAPM, which include that are managerial agency problems are 
diversified away (Welch, 2005). As a result, only market risk remains to be priced. This 
implies that within the CAPM, choices that affect information asymmetry, such as the choice 
for an investment bank or an auditor, accounting choices and voluntary disclosures, do not 
affect the cost of equity capital of a firm.  
The validity of the CAPM has been questioned, as other risk factors also have 
explanatory power in explaining and predicting stock returns.16 The main additional risk 
                                               
13
 In the voluntary disclosure context: managers across different firms cannot collude. 
14
 In this context, disclosure also entails information/reporting quality/precision in this context. 
15
 In this model, the cost of equity capital for a firm equals the risk free rate plus beta multiplied by the market 
premium.  
16
 The title of Fama and French (1996) – ‘CAPM is Wanted, Dead or Alive’ – illustrates the issue.  
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factors that empirical finance research has identified are size, book-to-market and momentum 
(Fama and French, 1992 and 1993; Carhart, 1997). However, none of these additional risk 
components factor in information. 
 
Two analytical papers explicitly model a link between information and the cost of 
equity capital.17 I will first discuss Easley and O’Hara (2004) (EOH), followed by Lambert et 
al. (2007) (LLV). 
 
EOH first stress the importance of information for the functioning of markets. They 
quote Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the SEC: 
“Quality information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets. Without it, investor 
confidence erodes. Liquidity dries up. Fair and efficient markets simply cease to 
exist.”18  (http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm) 
 
EOH continue by posing the following question:  
“If information matters for the market, why then should it not also matter for the firms 
that are in it?” 
 
Hence, EOH provide an analytical model in which information asymmetry is 
positively related to the cost of capital. The rationale behind their model is as follows. 
Multiple stocks exist with two types of investors: investors with private knowledge and 
investors without such knowledge. Investors who possess private knowledge update their 
portfolio with respect to their knowledge whereas the uninformed investors end up holding 
too little of the winning stocks and too much of the losing stocks because they are unable to 
update their portfolio.19 Thus, in order to compensate for their disadvantage, uninformed 
investors require a higher rate of return.  
Hence, the analytical model of EOH stages an adverse selection problem between 
shareholders (the uninformed) and management (the informed). Management has the ability 
to use their information advantage to trade with the uniformed when new shares are issued 
and by insider trading. The model predicts that when comparing two stocks that are identical 
except for the fact that they each have a different mix of public and private information, the 
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 Theoretical work relating information and liquidity includes Diamond and Verrecchia (1991).  
18
 Easley and O’Hara (2004), p. 1553.  
19
 Note that this risk cannot be diversified away. When an uninformed investor adds additional stocks to his 
portfolio, these stocks are also expected to underperform.  
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stock with more private information and less public information will have a higher cost of 
equity capital.20 
 
On the other hand, Lambert et al. (2007) (LLV) model the link between disclosure 
and the cost of capital through cash flows.21 Each firm makes an investment choice in order 
to maximize stock price. Stock price, in turn, relies on the quality of the disclosure. Thus, 
when new shares are issued, the amount that investors are willing to pay is affected by the 
quality of information. This way, information quality not only affects the market’s perception 
but also the actual future cash flows. 
LLV show that that higher quality information reduces the assessed variance of a 
firm’s cash flow and also that information quality changes decisions, which changes the ratio 
of expected cash flow to nondiversifiable covariance risk and hence influences a firm’s cost 
of capital. The latter effect cannot be diversified away.22 Also LLV’s model results in a 
testable relation between disclosure and the cost of equity capital. 
The main difference between the two models is the source of risk. In EOH’s model, 
risk exists because of the possibility that management initiates trades because of stock 
mispricing. This risk is reduced when management releases additional information, which 
reduces mispricing. In LLV’s model, risk is present because of potentially ‘bad’ investments 
by management. Risk in LLV is reduced with credible signals about future cash flows. Thus, 
EOH model adverse selection, whereas in LLV agency problems are ignored.23  
 
In addition to reducing adverse selection, voluntary disclosure also has the potential to 
reduce the moral hazard problem. Ferreira and Rezende (2007) (FR) study the disclosure of 
strategic information. They explain why managers disclose key strategic information by 
showing that managers face a trade-off when deciding whether to disclose their private 
information to outsiders or not. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers 
commit themselves to a particular strategy, which provides strong incentives for workers to 
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 Hughes et al. (2007) argue that there is no support for a risk premium demanded by uniformed investors: “In 
fact both informed and uninformed investors exploit liquidity traders whose demands are manifested in an 
assumption of noisy supply” (p. 708). 
21
 It can be argued that a relation between risk and cash flows also exists in EOH. If the equity cost of capital for 
some firm is lowered, then the number of positive NPV project will increase, as the hurdle rate is reduced. Thus, 
a reduced cost of equity capital increases expected future investments.  
22
 The intuition is as follows: Risk, given cash flow expectations, can be diversified; however, in LLV, risk is 
correlated with cash flow expectations.  
23
 Management in LLV is assumed to maximize stock price. The ‘bad’ investments do not reflect a moral hazard 
problem, but are the result of chance. 
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undertake strategy-specific investments. On the other hand, this commitment may 
inadvertently result in inefficient use of resources. In addition, the firm’s action set will be 
reduced after disclosure to outsiders, since it will be difficult for management to walk away 
from their commitment without losing their credibility. In this setting disclosure is a credible 
signal that reduces information asymmetry due to moral hazard.24 
1.4 Empirical disclosure literature 
 
Analytical disclosure literature generally assumes that the substance of the disclosure 
can be incorporated into the value of the firm directly. For example, in Verrecchia (1983), 
management signals the true market value of the firm to investors. In reality managers do not 
disclose the market value of the firm. Instead, disclosures can be comprised of an array of 
information. For example, when management issues an earnings forecast, this forecast can be 
for the current quarter, a next quarter, the current year, the next year, long term, etc. 
Management may issue one forecast or several forecasts at the same time. Each forecast can 
be qualitative, directional, a range or a point estimate. Instead of solely issuing guidance on 
earnings, management may also issue one or more additional forecasts, such as forecasts for 
sales, profitability measures, leverage/interest coverage ratios, operating or free cash flows, 
etc. Moreover, management can issue forecasts for non-financial data such as sales volume 
and industry specific ratios.  
Furthermore, analytical papers are generally silent on the channel through which the 
information is communicated. However, cost-benefit properties, such as credibility and value 
relevance, may be correlated with the channel through which the information is 
communicated. Empirical work exists for the different channels: the financial statements 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), conference calls (Tasker, 1998; Frankel et al., 1999), investor 
meetings (Roberts et al., 2006) and disclosure quality studies where all disclosures are 
aggregated into a single measure (Botosan, 1997; Healy et al., 1999; Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002; Miller, 2002). 
 
This section summarizes empirical disclosure literature most closely related to 
financial target disclosure, which includes studies of disclosure quality (where aggregate 
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 Adverse selection can also be reduced with the disclosure of new information, since it gets incorporated into 
the stock price. 
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measures of disclosure are investigated) and the management earnings forecast (also referred 
to as ‘guidance’) literature. 
Empirical studies examine various capital market attributes and consequences such as 
stock return and (updated) beliefs about earnings and risk, whereas analytical research 
models generally revolve only around stock price. Thus, an explanation of the relation 
between the maximization of stock price and the components of stock return precedes the 
summary of the empirical papers.  
1.4.1 Maximizing stock price and return decomposition 
 
Assuming efficient markets, finance theory expresses the value of a stock price P at 
time t as the present value of expected future dividends, Et[dt+τ], with the equity cost of 
















However, a firm’s stock price is not only affected by a change in beliefs about future 
dividends, but also by a change in beliefs about the equity cost of capital. Thus, voluntary 
disclosure potentially could alter beliefs about future dividends as well as beliefs about the 
equity cost of capital. When management decides to disclose some information, ƒ, they do so 
by anticipating what the investors’ reaction will be. However, investors also have their prior 
beliefs about management’s incentives and endowments, which they take into account when 
reacting to the release of new information. Assuming there are no agency costs, management 
chooses ƒ, subject to potential restraints such as truthful disclosure, so that investors’ 





















Furthermore, I define the marginal benefit of disclosing ƒ, V(ƒ), as the difference 
between ˆ ( )tP f and tP . For positive values of V(ƒ), disclosure increases stock price. I 
decompose the change in stock price the following way: 
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The first term in equation (A) is the present value of the conjectured change in 
expected future dividends, discounted by the revised equity cost of capital. The second term 
is the present value that arises due to the conjectured change in the equity cost of capital. 
Hereafter, I refer to these two elements as cash flow news and risk news, respectively. Thus, 
when ˆ ( )tP f  > tP  ( ˆ ( )tP f  < tP ), voluntary disclosure increases (decreases) stock price. 
This specification facilitates the study of a decision making process that involves a 
tradeoff between cash flow news and risk news in order to maximize stock price. For 
example, a positive NPV project corresponds to a positive present value of incremental future 
dividends, thus increasing stock price. Another example is switching from a small auditor to a 
large auditor, which can increase the stock price if the higher fees – negative cash flow news 
– are more than compensated through lowered risk.26 
 The tradeoff between cash flow news and risk news in equation (A) is not complete. It 
assumes that management maximizes current stock price, whereas in practice, management 
may also take future stock price into account. For example, management would never issue 
an earnings warning if management were always to maximize current stock price.27 Another 
example is the way management compensation is structured, which usually consists of a short 
term component (usually earnings based) and a longer term component (usually stock/options 
based) (Murphy, 1998). The longer term component of the compensation package forces 
management to also think about the future value of the stock price and not just the 
maximization of current stock price. Despite this shortcoming of equation (A), the tradeoff 
                                               
26  Equation (A) also has corresponding empirical equations. The equivalent regression equation in an event 
study can be represented as:  
abnormal stock return = α + β unexpected earnings + γ unexpected risk + ε 
Where abnormal stock return is actual stock return minus expected stock return. When a proxy for unexpected 
risk is not included, an omitted correlated variable problem exists. 
27
 As discussed before, when future stock price is also taken into account, issuing ‘bad news’ may soften a later 
stock price decline and/or reduce a litigation threat (Skinner, 1994). 
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between cash flow news and risk news is sufficient to relate the empirical disclosure literature 
to the analytical disclosure models.  
1.4.2 Disclosure quality 
 
Disclosure quality measure is an overall measure of the quality of corporate 
communications with investors. Since it is a score of overall disclosure and can be labeled as 
a firm characteristic, the short window event study method is not suitable for these studies. 
Instead, long window/association studies are used. Six main disclosure quality studies are 
summarized in this section. The contribution of each study is viewed via its relation to 
equation (A), i.e., whether a relation of disclosure is found with stock return or either of the 
two components of the equation (the cash flow news or risk news) or not. Three of these 
studies (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy et al., 1999; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) have 
used the ratings of the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)28 and 
the other three (Botosan, 1997; Miller, 2002; Francis et al., 2008) have used self-constructed 
measures of disclosure quality.      
The AIMR disclosure quality metric is constructed using a yearly survey amongst 
their members. Analysts rate the quality of firms’ disclosures on three categories: (1) required 
published information, (2) published information not required, and (3) other aspects, which 
include items such as quality and accessibility of Investor Relations, company-sponsored 
field trips and presentations to analysts. Discussion of the short- and long-term goals of the 
company is included in the section about the required published information.29 Guidance is 
not explicitly mentioned in the checklist. However, press releases and ‘adresses to analysts 
groups’ are included in the second category of non-required information (Healy et al., 1999, 
appendix).  
Lang and Lundholm (1993) investigate the determinants of the AIMR disclosure 
quality score. They find that disclosure quality is increasing in firm size, decreasing in value 
relevance of earnings30, and increasing in stock return. They also find that firms with high 
disclosure quality are more likely to issue new debt or equity. 
Healy et al. (1999) (HHP) find a significant improvement in stock performance and an 
increase in institutional ownership in both the first year of the disclosure increase as well as 
                                               
28
 Taken from the Corporate Information Committee’s Annual Reviews of Corporate Reporting Practices; 
formerly known as the FAF Reports. 
29
 However, it is noted that this information could be included in several areas of the report (Healy et al. (1999), 
p. 514). 
30
 Measured as the correlation between earnings and stock returns. 
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in the following year.31 However, HHP do not further decompose stock returns into cash flow 
news and risk news as shown in equation (A), so it is not clear what is driving the stock 
return.  
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) (BP) document a negative relation between the 
disclosure level in the annual report and the cost of capital, but also mark an increase in the 
cost of equity capital for firms that timely disclose information.32 Thus, they focus on a proxy 
for the equity cost of capital, which would actually have been one of the inputs for equation 
(A). They do not consider the relation between disclosure and stock return or earnings. 
Miller (2002) examines disclosure quantity for 80 firms. For these firms he measures 
the number of press releases using the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service currently known as 
Factiva. His results show that increased disclosure is correlated with periods of increased 
earnings. Also each disclosure item is placed in one of six mutually exclusive categories, 
including ‘earnings and sales’ forecast. The results remain statistically significant for each of 
the six categories.  
Botosan (1997) shows a negative relation between a self constructed measure of 
disclosure quality and the cost of equity capital, but only for firms with a low number of 
analysts following. The disclosure quality measure ‘DRANK’ is based on five categories 
with ‘management forecasts relating to market share, sales and profitability’ (FRANK) listed 
as one of the categories.33 The results for DRANK and FRANK are similar, which indicates 
that firms’ disclosure decisions are positively correlated for the five categories that Botosan 
considered. Similar to BP (2002), Botosan does not relate her research to stock returns, but to 
a proxy of the cost of equity capital instead. 
Francis et al. (2008) also focus on the cost of equity capital. They create a sample 
using Botosan’s (1997) coding scheme with two modifications. First, they focus on items that 
are voluntary in nature. Second, they add an additional category of “other financial measures” 
which include non-GAAP measures of performance. They report a negative relation between 
disclosure and the cost of capital, like BP and Botosan (2002). However, when they control 
for earnings quality, earnings variability and the absolute value of accruals, this relation is 
substantially reduced or disappears completely. 
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 They also document an increase in analyst following and a decrease in the bid-ask ratio, although the latter 
only at a significance level of 10%. 
32
 As a potential explanation, the authors state that more frequent disclosure may increase stock price volatility 
and thus result in a higher cost of equity capital.  
33
 Financial targets per se are not considered an element of the FRANK category. 
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 In summary, the main disclosure quality papers have focused on different elements of 
equation (A). If findings across these papers could be summarized34 in a nutshell, then 
increases in disclosure are associated with higher stock returns (HHP), which are caused by 
cash flow news (Miller). However, the evidence for the relation between disclosure and cost 
of equity capital is mixed. While Botosan (1997) finds a negative relation between disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital for firms with low analyst following (again repeated by BP for 
annual report disclosures), BP find that more timely disclosure increases the equity cost of 
capital.  
1.4.3 Management earnings forecasts 
 
 Since disclosure quality is an overall measure of the quality of corporate 
communications, it is higher for firms that issue earnings forecasts. Miller (2002) reports that 
increased ‘sales and earnings forecast’ disclosure precedes periods of earnings increases. 
Thus, on average, forecasts convey good news. Hence, management earnings forecast 
literature examines properties of these forecasts and the stock market reaction to the release 
of such information, where, in terms of equation (A), abnormal stock return is regressed 
against unexpected earnings. 
 This section summarizes the various properties of the management earnings forecast 
and examines both research that investigates why management issues forecasts and research 
that investigates the credibility of earnings forecasts.  
 Properties of management earnings forecasts include: forecast specificity, the length 
of the forecast horizon, the sign of the unexpected earnings, initial forecasts versus revised 
versions, and the forecast error. Of these properties, forecast specificity has been researched 
most extensively. A forecast’s specificity is either bounded35, within a range, a point estimate 
or the forecast is qualitative. 
Baginski and Hassell (1997) and Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that a longer forecast 
horizon36 is associated with less precision. Also, Bamber and Cheon (1998) find forecasts to 
be less specific in highly competitive industries. In addition, Clarkson et al. (1994) find that 
firms in highly competitive industries with good news are less prone to issue a forecast. 
These results are consistent with high proprietary costs of voluntary disclosure for firms in 
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 Although they cannot be generalized as such since AIMR Reports focus on firms with high-quality and 
improving disclosure practices, while explicitly excluding firms with problematic or poor disclosure practices 
(HHP). 
35
 A maximum or minimum is given. 
36
 The number of days between the date the forecast is issued and the fiscal period end date. 
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highly competitive industries. Furthermore, specificity is decreasing with earnings volatility 
(Skinner, 1995) and decreasing in firm size (Baginski and Hassell, 1997). Several studies 
(Skinner, 1994; Baginski and Hassell, 1997; Soffer et al., 2000) have investigated the relation 
between the sign of the unexpected earnings – good news/bad news – and specificity and 
have reported mixed results. Skinner (1994) finds that good news forecasts tend to be point 
and range estimates and that bad news forecasts tend to be qualitative statements. Baginski 
and Hassel (1997) find no relation between the sign of the news and specificity. Soffer et al. 
(2000) find that point and range estimates tend to be bad news. Results are also mixed with 
respect to the number of analysts following (Baginski and Hassel, 1997; Piotroski, 2002). 
Baginski and Hassel (1997) report a positive relation between the number of analysts and 
specificity, whereas Piotroski (2002) finds a negative relation.   
 
What is the motivation behind management choosing to issue a forecast? In general, 
forecasting firms are larger (Kross et al., 1994; Eng and Mak, 2003), have higher and more 
stable earnings rates (Kross et al., 1994) and their earnings are more informative about firm 
value (Lennox and Park, 2006). Ruland et al. (1990) find that the tendency of management to 
release forecasts in an effort to move prevailing market expectations toward management 
beliefs (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984) is a small factor and that the ownership structure37 (Eng and 
Mak, 2003) and new shares offerings are the most important factors explaining management 
forecasts (Skinner, 1995).  
Francis et al. (2008) find that disclosure quality based on voluntary disclosures in the 
annual report is positively related with earnings quality, whereas issuing management 
forecasts is not related. 
Corporate governance structures also play an important role when it comes to issuing 
management earnings forecasts. Firms with effective governance mechanisms38 are more 
likely to make a management forecast, especially when the sign of the unexpected news is 
negative (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Firms with higher institutional ownership are more 
likely to issue a management earnings forecast. However, when institutional ownership is 
concentrated, firms are less likely to issue forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
lower managerial ownership and significant government ownership are associated with 
increased disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Chen et al. (2007) compare family firms with 
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 A higher percentage of voting stock held by directors and officers is associated with a reduced probability of 
issuing a forecast. 
38
 More effective board and audit committee structures. 
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non-family firms and find that family firms provide less voluntary disclosure of both good 
and bad forward-looking information.  
In addition, Brown et al. (2006) investigate whether or not managers herd when they 
decide on voluntarily disclosing expenditure forecasts.39 They find that managers are more 
likely to disclose their expenditure plans when peers have signalled a decrease in future 
capital spending and when prior peer forecasts are more specific. In addition, they find that 
less reputable managers exhibit greater tendencies to herd in their disclosure decisions. 
 
In line with equation (A), previous research has found that the stock market reaction 
is correlated with the sign of the cash flow news as well as the magnitude of the cash flow 
news (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Waymire, 1984). Large earnings surprises cause stock price 
volatility to increase in the 15 day period after the release (Piotroski, 2002). Pownall et al. 
(1993) find no statistically significant difference in forecast specificity and stock price 
volatility, whereas Piotroski (2002) finds that specificity is negatively correlated with stock 
price volatility, i.e., the more specific the guidance is, the lower the volatility. In addition, the 
absolute market response for a unit of earnings surprise is higher when investors perceive 
management as more credible.  
  Management credibility is an important factor when examining a firm’s voluntary 
disclosure. As opposed to the financial statements, management forecasts are unaudited. 
Therefore, management forecasts may be less credible than mandatory disclosed information. 
Nonetheless, empirical research indicates that management forecasts are credible where the 
extent of the credibility is tested through market reaction to unexpected earnings. If voluntary 
disclosure had lacked any credibility, there would have been no market reaction at all. 
Pownall and Waymire (1989) indicate that management forecasts, on average, are associated 
with larger stock price reactions compared to mandatory disclosures. Hence, the authors 
conclude that forecasts are an effective way for management to communicate relevant 
information to investors. Also, the forecast contains relevant information for analysts as Shen 
(2008) documents that analysts who cover a firm that issues a management earnings forecast 
provide more accurate earnings forecast revisions for other firms in the same industry than 
analysts who do not cover the firm that issued the forecast. Ng et al. (2008) document an 
underreaction to management earnings forecasts which is smaller when credibility is higher. 
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 Herding is broadly defined to include any similarity or convergence in behavior brought about by the 
interaction of individuals or firms (Brown et al., 2006 and Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
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In the situation where management earnings forecast differs from analyst earnings 
forecast, investors appear to place greater weight on the management forecast (Hansen and 
Noe, 1999). Williams (1996) shows a positive relation between the usefulness of a prior 
forecast and the stock market reaction to a following forecast. This suggests that management 
indeed establishes a forecasting reputation over time.  
 Mercer (2004) makes a distinction between the credibility of the disclosure and the 
credibility of management itself, which influences the former. When assessing the credibility 
of a disclosure, investors take several factors into account like management incentives at the 
time of disclosure, internal/external assurance and characteristics of the disclosure itself, such 
as precision, venue, timing, inherent plausibility and the amount of supporting information. 
Thus, credibility is a complicated issue to dissect. 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) report that the market reaction to management forecast 
announcements is related to board and audit committee characteristics—especially when the 
forecast signals good news. This evidence suggests that investors have greater confidence in 
good news forecasts that undergo the scrutiny of more effective boards and audit committees.  
Skinner (1994) finds a higher market response for bad news, which implies that 
investors interpret bad news as more credible. Hutton et al. (2003) examine the interaction of 
management earnings forecasts and supplementary information. They find that ‘bad’ news 
forecasts are always informative and that ‘good’ news forecasts are only informative when 
accompanied by verifiable forward looking information. They include additional expectations 
as verifiable forward looking information such as forecasts of sales, margins, earnings before 
income and taxes, cash flows, and growth rates. 
In an experimental setting, Hirst et al. (2007) find that disaggregate forecasts40 are 
more credible than ‘bottom line’ earnings forecasts. In addition, they find that disaggregation 
enhances credibility through increases in the perceived precision of management’s beliefs, 
perceived clarity of the forecast and perceived financial reporting quality. 
With respect to some factors, previous research has produced mixed evidence. 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that forecasting firms have a larger proportion of outside directors, 
whereas Eng and Mak (2003) find the opposite.41 Kross et al. (1994) find that forecasting 
firms are highly leveraged whereas Eng and Mak (2003) find that firms with lower debt have 
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 In their experiment the disaggregate forecast consists of a forecast of all the items on the income statement 
(sales, cost of goods sold, etc.).  
41
 A potential explanation for the difference in findings is that the sample of Eng and Mak (2003) consists of 
firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. Also, Eng and Mak use a disclosure index, whereas Ajinkya et al. 
(2005) consider management earnings forecasts. 
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greater disclosure. The finding of Kross et al. (1994) that forecasting firms display lower 
growth rates does not generalize to all voluntary disclosures since Frankel et al. (1999) find 
that high growth firms are more likely to hold conference calls. Thus, prior research has 
much to reconcile about the nature of firms that issue management earnings forecasts. Since 
Eng and Mak (2003) examine firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange, some of the 
differences may be related to institutional differences between countries. 
1.5 Financial targets 
 
With the disclosure of a financial target the firm commits to the achievement of 
specific financial goals within a certain time frame.42 Target-disclosing firms issue specific 
goals or targets, such as (growth in) earnings, sales, ebitda, costs, or a measure of 
profitability. Guidance-issuing firms, on the other hand, issue management forecasts that 
provide information about the expected outcome of the company’s operations, such as the 
expected level of earnings, sales, or cost reductions in a certain period of time.  
The differentiating factor between a target and an expectation is that a target implies 
goal commitment, whereas an expectation does not. Goal commitment is defined as an 
unwillingness to abandon or lower a goal (Campion and Lord, 1982). This attribute, which is 
lacking in a forecast, has the potential to reduce information asymmetry in several ways. 
First of all, goal commitment can reduce adverse selection to a larger extent than a 
forecast. In particular, disclosing a target signals that management has precise information 
about future profitability and/or that management is ‘in control’ of the firm. Skinner (1995) 
shows that when management has disclosed a forecast, this forecast is more often revised 
downwards, than it is revised upwards. Skinner argues that firms revise their forecast 
downward to prevent class action suits. An alternative explanation is offered by the survey 
results of Graham et al. (2005). Their findings indicate that managers feel that missing their 
own earnings forecast signals that they are not in control of their firm. It is likely that revising 
their forecast downwards harms their reputation to a lesser extent than missing their initial 
forecast. The act of goal commitment – the unwillingness to abandon or lower a goal – 
therefore signals a reduced probability of a subsequent revision: i.e., a target of $1.00 
earnings per share signals that it is more likely to be met than a forecast of $1.00.  
Second, goal commitment can potentially reduce moral hazard presuming 
management would be willing to exert more effort in order to meet a target than a forecast. 
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 ‘Target(s)’ and ‘financial target(s)’ are used interchangeably. 
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However, another potential moral hazard problem can arise at the same time if this is the 
case: when it is clear to management that the target cannot be met by exerting effort, 
management can shift that extra effort into earnings management (Kasznik, 1999; Schweitzer 
et al., 2004). 
Another indication that a target differs from a forecast is provided by Indjejikian et al. 
(2009). On a survey of 793 firms on target setting within the firm, they find a low frequency 
of negative earnings targets and a very high frequency of zero earnings targets, suggesting 
that management is reluctant to set negative earnings targets. Extending their finding to 
voluntary disclosure by management to investors, it would indicate that management would 
rather disclose a loss forecast, than publicly commit to a loss.  
In general, for a signal to have informational value, it must be costly for ‘low quality’ 
type of firms to use it.43 For target disclosure this means that, in expectation, the benefits of 
issuing and meeting a target for ‘high quality’ firms exceed the costs of missing the target. If 
in expectation, the benefits were to exceed the costs for ‘low quality’ firms as well, then all 
firms would always issue targets. In such a setting, investors would ignore target information. 
Since in practice only some firms issue targets, it is likely that target disclosure is a useful 
signaling instrument.  
 
In summary, a target can signal higher future earnings and higher management 
competence compared to a forecast; potentially reduce information asymmetry; and be a 
more credible signal than a forecast.44 However, a target’s incremental costs can include an 
increased possibility of earnings management (Kasznik, 1999); increased probability of 
higher litigation costs for the firm (Skinner, 1994); and reputational damage if the target is 
not met or abandoned (Graham et al., 2005). 
   
Previous literature has not made the distinction between target disclosure and 
management forecasts. Analytical disclosure papers are generally simplified for 
computational ease, for example by assuming that there are no agency problems between 
shareholders and management. The differences between a target and a forecast, as discussed 
above, need to be explicitly modeled. To my knowledge, there exists no such analytical 
paper. With the exception of Ferreira and Rezende (2007), who model voluntary disclosure of 
                                               
43
 For example, big audit firms have higher audit quality because of their ‘deep pockets’. For a firm with ‘bad’ 
accounting, it will be costly to switch to a big audit firm, because the big audit firm will not approve the firm’s 
accounting (Scott, 2006).  
44
 Resulting in a larger market reaction per unit of unexpected earnings. 
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strategic information, which could be applied to target disclosure. Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that a forecast contains strategic information as well. 
Empirical disclosure papers have not investigated target disclosure, with the exception 
of Cools and Van Praag (2003). In their exploratory study, Cools and Van Praag have 
investigated the association between corporate target disclosure and stock returns, where they 
find evidence that setting one quantified target is value relevant compared to disclosing no 
targets or multiple targets. Analysis of data gathered by an additional survey indicates that 
usage within the firm (‘rolling out’) of the one target can also be value relevant.  
Thus, in the empirical disclosure literature, many of the target firms may have been 
inadvertently categorized as forecasting firms. In this dissertation, I specifically examine the 
properties of target disclosing firms and capital market consequences/attributes. Overall, I 
expect target disclosure to be a stronger signal with respect to future earnings than a forecast 
and an important instrument in reducing information asymmetry. 
1.6 Research questions 
 
The primary difference between a target and a forecast is goal commitment, which is 
the unwillingness to lower or abandon the target. If the cost in terms of a damaged reputation 
or litigation costs of missing a target is higher than the cost of missing a forecast, then targets 
are expected to constitute a stronger signal than a forecast would with respect to future 
earnings, as well as reducing information asymmetry. This implies that management at the 
time of the target disclosure is more certain of meeting the target, and/or that management is 
willing to exert more effort in order to meet the target. 
As opposed to management earnings forecasts, financial target disclosure has hardly 
been researched. Target setting within the firm, however, is a common object of 
investigation. I therefore believe examining target disclosure by management is relevant and 
interesting.  
The results presented in the paper of Cools and Van Praag (2003) indicate that target 
disclosing firms outperform other firms. However, many questions remain. The questions 
addressed in this dissertation are the following: Is disclosing a target a stronger signal than a 
forecast? And is signaling multiple targets even better? Does it signal strength in future 
earnings, or does it reduce risk? To which extent is missing a target punished by the stock 
market? Is there a differential announcement effect of a target versus a forecast? Is the effect 
conditional on other news which is released at the same time with the target? Is target 
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disclosure incorporated into the stock price at the time of announcement, or is it included in 
the stock price over the period it is realized?  
There are other relevant questions that I do not address. I do not investigate what is 
driving management’s decision to disclose or not. I also do not consider how easy or difficult 
it is for management to meet the targets.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I investigate 
target disclosure by Dutch firms, where I test for a differential effect between a single target 
and multiple targets. I also consider the realization of the targets. In chapter 3, I compare the 
stock price, short and long term stock returns and the equity cost of capital for target 
disclosing firms versus guidance firms with a listing in the U.S. In chapter 4 I conduct an 
event study, comparing target disclosing firms with forecasting firms where I control for 
unexpected earnings. Finally, I summarize and discuss the findings in chapter 5. 
 
